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AGGREGATION AND URBAN
MISDEMEANORS
Alexandra Natapoff*
ABSTRACT
The urban misdemeanor process relies on a wide variety of
informal groupings and aggregations. Order maintenance police
arrest large numbers of people based on neighborhood, age, race, and
other generalizations. Prosecutors and public defenders resolve
entire classes of minor plea bargains based on standard local practices
and pricing. Urban courts process hundreds of cases en masse. At
each stage, the pressure to aggregate—to treat people and cases by
group—weakens and sometimes eliminates individuated scrutiny of
defendants and the evidence in their cases; people are largely
evaluated, convicted, and punished by category and based on
institutional habit. This wholesale process of creating criminal
convictions in the aggregate is in deep tension with core precepts of
criminal law, most fundamentally the idea that criminal guilt is an
individuated concept reflecting the defendant’s personal culpability.
This Article traces the influence of different sorts of aggregation
through each step of the urban misdemeanor process, demonstrating
how that process has effectively abandoned the individuated model of
guilt and lost many of the essential characteristics of a classic
“criminal” system of legal judgment.
It then explores civil
scholarship’s insights into the substantive power that informal
aggregations can exert over liability rules and outcomes, in particular
how mass settlement scenarios can generate no-fault liability regimes
with high risks of fraud. The Article concludes that the misdemeanor
system as it currently stands does not function as a traditional
“criminal” system of judgment in large part because aggregation
erodes the substantive content of criminal convictions.

* Professor of Law & Theodore A. Bruinsma Fellow, Loyola Law School, Los
Angeles. This Article was developed in part while I was a Scholar-in-Residence at
NYU School of Law, Center on the Administration of Criminal Law. My thanks to
participants at the Fordham Law School Cooper-Walsh Colloquium and the
University of Chicago Criminal Justice Roundtable, and to my colleagues at the
Loyola faculty workshop series.
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INTRODUCTION
The concept of criminal guilt is fundamentally individuated. The
idea that someone is “guilty”—that he or she “committed a crime”—
refers inexorably to that particular individual and his or her actions
and intentions. Not all criminal legal concepts are individuated in this
way. Sentencing categories, CompStat policing, even inferences
about probable cause or reasonable suspicion often rest quite
properly on categorical reasoning and generalizations about human
behavior. But the ultimate determination of personal guilt is special.
It constitutes a unique sort of statement about individual action and
culpability, the polar opposite of “guilt by association.” Likewise, the
consequences of a conviction—punishment, stigma, and other

NATAPOFF_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

AGGREGATION & MISDEMEANORS

6/26/2013 8:34 PM

1045

burdens—are justified largely by reference to the notion that a
particular criminal offender personally deserves those burdens. In
the simplest terms, we are permitted to punish “criminals”—people
who have sustained convictions—because getting convicted indicates
that a particular person did something that can and should be
punished.
Because of the individualized nature of the underlying concept of
criminal liability, the basic rules and procedures by which liability is
imposed are themselves strongly individuated. They are designed, at
least in theory, to ensure that convictions properly attach to the
individuals who actually committed particular crimes. In effect, the
demand for individualized evidence and individuated proceedings
reflects a deeper understanding that the ultimate decision to impose
legal guilt is particular to that defendant and therefore requires an
individuated path.
In the massive world of petty offense processing, that fundamental
commitment to individuation has eroded. The urban misdemeanor
system in particular is permeated by various forms of aggregation and
group-based processing. More than any other area of the criminal
system, misdemeanor defendants are identified, processed, convicted,
and punished in large numbers based on generalized characteristics
through procedures that are insensitive to individual evidence or
circumstances. Some of these “aggregations” take place during
policing; others take place during the mass adjudication process. At
each stage, the sheer scale and institutional habits of the urban petty
offense system put immense pressure on decision-makers to forgo
individualized considerations. The resulting decisions are thus
unmoored from individuated evidence and made without the
particularized scrutiny promised by bedrock due process norms.
The aggregations of the urban misdemeanor system are informal,
often institutionally based, and take different forms. For example,
order maintenance policing often involves the arrest of groups of
people driven by aggregate generalizations about age, neighborhood,
and race. Later in the process, overworked public defenders typically
advise clients to accept pleas based on aggregate criteria such as the
“market price” for that offense in that jurisdiction, rather than the
individual evidence or characteristics of that particular defendant.
Bail is often set based on a schedule; punishments are standardized to
the offense rather than the offender. While the aggregating or nonindividualistic tendencies at each stage may appear tolerable for that
particular decision-maker, or tempered by the possibility of later
individuated consideration, taken together the aggregate tendencies
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swamp the whole. As a result, the misdemeanor process is dominated
by group inferences and aggregate institutional habits, and only
weakly tied to the sorts of individuated demands for evidence and
process that assure the validity of criminal convictions.
As a result of these various aggregating tendencies, the urban
misdemeanor process is in tension with many core legitimating
features of the criminal process itself.
Most fundamentally,
misdemeanor processing is lackadaisical about individual guilt, i.e.,
the idea that criminal liability with its personal stigma and social
consequences can only attach to individuals, not to groups, and that
liability should be based on actus reus and mens rea, i.e., what
individuals do and intend. Instead, the process tends to select and
convict people en masse without the standard procedural checks that
ask whether individual defendants actually did what they are accused
of doing. Accordingly, these aggregating tendencies are not merely
procedural flaws but conceptual game-changers: taken together they
call into question whether the urban petty offense system actually
selects and adjudicates guilt based on individual criminal culpability.
While there is no precise moment when the process declares guilt
based on group membership, the collective effects of aggregation
drive the process in that direction. At its worst, these aggregating
tendencies indicate that, in an important sense, the urban
misdemeanor system does not behave in the individuated ways that a
“criminal system,” with all its moral and punitive power, is supposed
to behave in order to wield the unique authority of criminal justice.
The criminal discourse does not openly acknowledge the formative
influence of aggregation on misdemeanors. This is in part because
the petty offense process is rarely conceptualized as a unified whole.
Instead, each stage—especially urban policing—tends to get
scrutinized on its own terms with limited reference to what happens
at other stages in the process. For example, there is a robust
literature on the racially skewed, indiscriminate sweeping quality of
urban policing processes such as order maintenance and zero
tolerance. A different scholarship criticizes the mass processing of
urban petty offenders by overburdened and under-resourced public
defender offices. The full picture, however, is even more troubling
than the individual critiques. Because each stage tolerates decisions
made in the aggregate based on generalizations, earlier aggregations
slip through and are reinforced by later ones. Not only does
adjudication neglect to check the overly generalized decisions made
during investigation, it permits new aggregations to leave their mark.
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Perhaps more fundamentally, the criminal discourse fails to
acknowledge the force of its own aggregating tendencies because they
are forbidden. At rock bottom, it is illegitimate to impose criminal
convictions in the aggregate, and so traditional doctrines and
frameworks do not accommodate such descriptions. Not so in the
civil literature. Because civil law makes room for formal aggregations
such as class actions and multidistrict litigation, the scholarship has
better analytic tools to recognize the impact of informal aggregations
that occur without legal or judicial imprimatur.1
In particular, the civil literature offers two insights into the
substantive effects of informal aggregation that have surprising
resonance in the misdemeanor context. The first is the recognition
that an individual aggregator—such as a large well-resourced plaintiff
or prosecutor’s office—can shape the litigation process to impose
enormous pressure to settle on small dispersed parties who lack
resources and incentives to contest small claims. In effect, the power
to informally aggregate others is a form of socio-legal authority.
Second, the mass settlement environment can create an informal “nofault” regime in which liability is presumed once an allegation of
injury (or in the criminal arena, guilt) has been made. Where
centralized bureaucracies are formally adversarial (large plaintiff law
firms versus insurance companies, prosecutorial versus public
defender offices) but in fact have strong institutional understandings
that cases will settle as a matter of generic routine, it erodes
substantive liability requirements.
In other words, informal
institutional aggregations can actually change the operative content of
the law.2
The purpose of this Article is to explore the effects of aggregation
in the criminal law, and the misdemeanor process in particular, with
respect to the foundational question of personal guilt. It identifies
urban misdemeanors as the most extreme expression of the system’s
tendency to answer the question of criminal guilt in the aggregate
and, in turn, identifies aggregation as a key feature of what is
problematic about urban policing and the generation of petty
convictions. It is the second article in a series exploring the
significance of the misdemeanor process for the U.S. criminal system
a whole.3
1. See infra Part IV.
2. See infra Part IV.
3. The first article describes the misdemeanor process and its deviations from
core principles of criminal justice including due process, evidence-based accuracy,
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Part I articulates the structural, legitimating role of individuation in
criminal convictions. It describes how philosophical commitments to
individuation are intimately tied both to notions of rule-of-law and to
the democratic state’s moral authority to punish. It then identifies
concrete rules and mechanisms by which the criminal system enforces
this individuation commitment and traces the specifics of how they
ensure individuated outcomes. It is precisely such rules and
mechanisms that erode or go unenforced in the misdemeanor context,
effectively permitting aggregate decision making without formal
acknowledgement or validation.
Part II conceptualizes “informal aggregation” as a set of decisional
tendencies that quietly erode individualizing procedures and
commitments central to the criminal process. While aggregation
takes different forms at various stages of the criminal process, some
versions are conceptually more pernicious than others. Moreover,
while informal aggregations exist throughout the system, they do not
affect outcomes in the same way. At the top of the penal hierarchy,
where cases are serious and/or well-litigated, defendants can insist on
countervailing individualizing procedures and escape the influence of
aggregate tendencies.
At the bottom, by contrast, the mass
adjudication of hundreds of thousands of petty offenses and poor
defendants precludes such rigor.4 Here, aggregation tendencies
collectively overwhelm the individualized ideal.
Part III zeroes in on the specific aggregating tendencies of each
stage of the petty criminal process—from policing to bail to
prosecutorial screening, defense counsel, plea bargaining, and the
lower courts. This examination reveals the concrete mechanisms by
which each step of the misdemeanor system contributes to the erosion
of individualized treatment and ultimately permits convictions to be
produced in the aggregate.
Part IV turns to the civil area in which the effects of informal
aggregation are more widely acknowledged. It focuses on two

and racial neutrality. See Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV.
1313 (2012) [hereinafter Natapoff, Misdemeanors]. A third article describes the
limited power of misdemeanor defense counsel to ensure fair outcomes in light of the
structural imbalances of the misdemeanor process. See Alexandra Natapoff, Gideon
Skepticism, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1049 (2013) [hereinafter Natapoff, Gideon
Skepticism].
4. For a conceptualization of the criminal system as a pyramid in which legality
wanes towards the bottom, see Alexandra Natapoff, The Penal Pyramid: Linking
Criminal Theory and Social Practice (n.d.) (unpublished manuscript) (draft on file
with author).
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examples—high volume law suits against file sharers and other small,
widely dispersed defendants, and so-called tort “settlement mills”—
that reveal the substantive impact that informal aggregation can have
on case outcomes and the meaning of liability schemes.
Part V contends that pervasive informal aggregation undermines
the claim that the urban misdemeanor process is entitled to the moral
and penal authority wielded by authentically “criminal” processes.
This Part offers several ways of conceptualizing urban
misdemeanors—as expressions of Herbert Packer’s “crime control”
model, for example, or as a live example of “actuarial” justice.5 It
concludes that aggregation is a prime contributor to the urban
criminal system’s loss of legitimacy, both theoretically and in the eyes
of its own subjects.
To be clear, aggregation is not the sole flaw of the urban
misdemeanor process. It may not even be the worst. Even if every
misdemeanant were to receive fully individuated consideration, the
petty offense system would still criminalize conduct that arguably
should not be criminal in the first place. It would still shift vast
discretionary authority to the police, and it would likely still impose
its heaviest burdens on socially vulnerable populations. Moreover,
aggregation is not unique to misdemeanors, since every arena of
criminal justice must grapple in its own way with the tension between
the ideals of individuation and the reality of bureaucratic
generalizations. Nevertheless, the concept of aggregation captures a
large swath of what ails the urban misdemeanor process. It elucidates
the system’s indifference to evidentiary accuracy, its class and racial
skew, and the dehumanization of assembly line processing.
Aggregation thus provides a powerful conceptual lens through which
to understand and critique one of the largest and most dysfunctional
segments of the American criminal process.
I. THE ANTI-AGGREGATION PRINCIPLE IN CRIMINAL LAW
Aggregation is anathema to the traditional concept of criminal
guilt. At its core, criminal law is about evidence of personal
culpability—whether a particular individual committed a particular
crime and therefore can be legitimately punished—an inquiry that by
its nature must take place person by person. As Justice Frankfurter
once put it, “[t]he administration of law, particularly that of the
criminal law, normally operates in an environment that is not
5. See infra Part V.
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universal or even general but individual.”6 Criminal jurisprudence
revolves largely around individuated notions of personal culpability,
free will, and liberty. Central tenets of criminal law are devoted to
ensuring both substantive and procedural individuation: defendants
are entitled both to a substantive evidentiary basis for finding guilt
under law, and procedures that ensure that they are evaluated and
adjudicated on the merits of their specific cases.7 To a more limited
extent, they are also entitled to be treated as individual people, with
unique histories and desires that inform their personal choices about
how to handle their own criminal cases. This is not to say that
criminal law claims to be free of heuristics and group-based
generalizations: it is riddled with them as are all human cognitive
endeavors.8 But in the main, criminal law and theory strain mightily
to reduce the impact of such reasoning and to keep questions of guilt
firmly rooted in individuated scenarios of evidence and procedure.
A. Theoretical Commitments to Individuation
Classic criminal theory revolves around three interrelated
concerns: moral culpability, free will, and the punitive authority of the
state.9 Each of these concepts is keyed to various aspects of
individualism. To the extent that a person commits a crime worthy of
moral condemnation, and does so as a product of his free will (for
example, by intentionally committing a voluntary act), the state is
entitled to punish him. Conversely, unless that person has done
something to deserve and warrant punishment, the state lacks moral

6. Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 366 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
7. See, e.g., Ariel Porat & Eric A. Posner, Aggregation and Law, 122 YALE L.J.
2, 44 (2012) (“If there are several defendants accused of committing several crimes,
none of them will be convicted even if statistically each of them probably committed
some of the crimes.”). Porat and Posner assume that what they call “cross-person
aggregation”—in effect statistical guilt-by-association—does not occur in criminal
law, although in some sense this is precisely the result of procedural aggregation in
the misdemeanor context.
8. See generally DANIEL S. MEDWED, PROSECUTION COMPLEX: AMERICA’S
RACE TO CONVICT AND ITS IMPACT ON THE INNOCENT (2012) (documenting how
prosecutors experience professional incentives and psychological pressures that
contribute to wrongful convictions); DAN SIMON, IN DOUBT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS (2012) (arguing that investigative and adjudicative
processes are often inaccurate due to widespread cognitive flaws in police and legal
decision making).
9. See, e.g., Gideon Yaffe, “The Government Beguiled Me”: The Entrapment
Defense and the Problem of Private Entrapment, 1 J. ETHICS & SOC. PHIL. 2, 5 (2005)
(discussing conceptual relationships between moral action, free choice, and
government conduct).
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and political authority to move against him, at least in a democratic
state committed to liberal values of individual liberty and autonomy.10
Indeed, the central proffered justifications for the penal process—
retributivism, deterrence, rehabilitation, incapacitation11—assume the
existence of an individual agent who can be morally judged,
psychologically deterred, behaviorally rehabilitated, or at the very
least forcibly prevented from reoffending.12
More formally, the concept of individuated decision—making and
the application of rules to particular facts is a central feature of ruleof-law. Particularized decision—making is the opposite of “guilt by
association,” condemnation based on status, and other
generalizations forbidden by criminal law. As Frederick Schauer put
it,
[T]o make decisions on the basis of the characteristics of particular
events or particular individuals, rather than on the basis of the
characteristics of the groups or classes of which the particulars may
be members, is often thought to be a moral imperative. Indeed, it is
often thought to define the concept of justice . . . .13

By contrast, collective punishment has few philosophical
defenders.14 It finds its strongest support in connection with atypical

10. Sharon Dolovich, Legitimate Punishment in Liberal Democracy, 7 BUFF.
CRIM. L. REV. 307, 313–14 (2004) (“If the idea of a liberal democracy means
anything, it means a commitment to what we can think of as the ‘baseline’ liberal
democratic values: individual liberty, dignity, and bodily integrity; limited
government; the primacy and sovereignty of the individual; and the entitlement of all
citizens to equal consideration and respect.”).
11. Robert Weisberg, Reality-Challenged Philosophies of Punishment, 95 MARQ.
L. REV. 1203, 1204 (2012).
12. By contrast, as an empirical matter, sociological analyses often describe the
criminal process as dissociated from these classic normative justifications and more
concerned with matters of group identification and control. These descriptive
assertions are discussed infra in Part V.
13. FREDERICK SCHAUER, PROFILES, PROBABILITIES, AND STEREOTYPES 19–20
(2003). Schauer himself rejects this classic formulation, arguing that there is nothing
morally sacrosanct about the individual or the particular. In his view, all legal
reasoning is in essence a form of actuarial reasoning, and under certain circumstances
such reasoning can be sufficiently accurate and rigorous to legitimately support
criminal liability. Id. at 18–19, 22–23.
14. Compare Daryl J. Levinson, Collective Sanctions, 56 STAN. L. REV. 345, 349
(2003) (providing a “functional defense” of collective sanctions and arguing that
“collective sanctions might be justified as an indirect way of controlling individual
wrongdoers”), with M. Chris Fabricant, War Crimes and Misdemeanors:

Understanding “Zero-Tolerance” Policing as a Form of Collective Punishment and
Human Rights Violation, 3 DREXEL L. REV. 373, 373 (2011) (characterizing collective
punishment as a violation of international human rights law).
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scenarios and offenses such as blood feuds,15 conspiracy,16 and war
crimes,17 although even conspiracy requires some individualized
culpability.18 In the main, criminal jurisprudence is firmly rooted in
what Chris Kutz calls the “solipsism of the individualistic conception”
of personal accountability and criminal guilt.19
B.

Substantive Individuation in Criminal Law

This theoretical commitment to individuation is instantiated in core
substantive criminal rules and procedures. Perhaps the most obvious
is the mens rea requirement itself, the demand that in all but a
handful of cases, criminal guilt requires inquiry into what the
defendant subjectively, actually intended at the time of the offense.20
The idea that a person’s criminal culpability turns on the exercise of
their free will, their decisional capacities, and their knowledge of
consequences, is the ultimate commitment to individuation.21
Although we don’t always think about it this way, the requirement
of evidence is also a commitment to individuation. Evidence is how
we know a particular person committed a particular crime. It is
evidence that permits the application of general rules to specific

15. Levinson, supra note 14, at 352–54.
16. For example, Christopher Kutz’s philosophy of complicity would expand the
classic individualistic conception of accountability to include a “relational and
positional conception” in which an individual’s culpability would be evaluated in part
by reference to his relations to others. CHRISTOPHER KUTZ, COMPLICITY: ETHICS AND
LAW FOR A COLLECTIVE AGE 10 (2000).
17. See, e.g., Mark A. Drumbl, Collective Violence and Individual Punishment:
The Criminality of Mass Atrocity, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 539, 570–71 (2005) (arguing that
“[t]he group element to certain international crimes, especially genocide . . . is central
to the offense,” and therefore “international criminal law’s formal predicate of
avoiding collective guilt may need to be revisited”).
18. See United States v. Garcia, 151 F.3d 1243, 1245–46 (9th Cir. 1998)
(defendant’s membership in violent gang and participation in group assault was
insufficient to establish crime of conspiracy and would “smack of guilt by
association”).
19. KUTZ, supra note 16, at 5.
20. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (2011) (imposing a mens rea
requirement on all but a small category of offenses).
21. See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, Inevitable Mens Rea, 27 HARV. J.L. PUB. POL’Y
51 (2003). The notion that people have free will separate and apart from their social
contexts is, of course, a long-contested proposition. See Craig Haney, Making Law
Modern: Toward a Contextual Model of Justice, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 3, 17–
19 (2002) (arguing that traditional criminal concepts of free will and autonomy are
outdated in light of modern psychological contextualism).

NATAPOFF_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

AGGREGATION & MISDEMEANORS

6/26/2013 8:34 PM

1053

cases, the driving dynamic of rule of law itself.22 Without evidence,
there is no reason to think any particular person is guilty of a crime
and therefore no basis for attributing liability to them.
Criminal law varies its demand for evidentiary individuation
depending on the nature of the legal conclusion to be drawn.23 A
Terry stop requires individuation, but only in the form of evidence
amounting to reasonable suspicion;24 probable cause requires
“particularized” evidence rendering it probable that a crime has been
committed;25 by contrast, a conviction at trial requires certainty
beyond a reasonable doubt that a particular person committed a
particular crime.26
By adjusting the demand for individuated
evidence, the law signals the extent to which the law will or will not
tolerate the classic aggregative move of imposing “guilt by
association.”27 It also signals the robustness of the legal conclusions
about individual guilt that can be drawn at any given stage of the
process, the most important being the conclusion that the person is
eligible not merely for a stop or arrest but an actual conviction.
C.

Procedural Individuation

Criminal procedure provides the concrete mechanisms by which we
enforce our theoretical commitment to substantive individuation.
Numerous criminal procedural rules are aimed at generating
individuated answers to key questions: Did this defendant actually do
it? Did this defendant know what his rights were? Were this
defendant’s personal choices honored? Doctrinally speaking, the

22. Ronald J. Allen & Brian Leiter, Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of
Evidence, 87 VA. L. REV. 1491, 1501, 1538 (2001) (describing the law of evidence as
those rules designed to “increase the frequency with which truth [about guilt] is
ascertained” and arguing that this “veritistic” question “is the question all evidence
scholarship should be asking”); see also Harris v. United States, 404 U.S. 1232, 1233
(1971) (“It is beyond question, of course, that a conviction based on a record lacking
any relevant evidence as to a crucial element of the offense charged would violate
due process.”).
23. I have written more extensively about the relationship between guilt,
evidence, and informational rules in Deregulating Guilt: The Information Culture of
the Criminal System, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 965 (2008).
24. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26 (1968).
25. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979).
26. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 358 (1970).
27. Compare Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 91 (known drug activity in bar was insufficiently
individuated evidence to support probable cause with respect to bar patron), with
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (police could consider defendant’s
presence in high crime neighborhood in finding reasonable suspicion).
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individuation requirement takes a number of forms, perhaps the most
dramatic being the individual’s right to represent himself. As the
Court famously put it in Faretta,
The Sixth Amendment does not provide merely that a defense shall
be made for the accused; it grants to the accused personally the right
to make his defense. It is the accused, not counsel, who must be
‘informed of the nature and cause of the accusation,’ who must be
‘confronted with the witnesses against him,’ and who must be
accorded ‘compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.’28

For defendants who do not represent themselves, defense counsel
is the primary agent of individuation, the mechanism by which each
defendant gets a fair and accurate adjudication with respect to him.
Indeed, in 1972 when the Supreme Court insisted on the right to
counsel for misdemeanants, it was motivated to do so in part to
counter the aggregating tendencies of mass misdemeanor processing,
where “[s]uddenly it becomes clear that for most defendants in the
criminal process, there is scant regard for them as individuals. They
are numbers on dockets, faceless ones to be processed and sent on
their way. The gap between the theory and the reality is enormous.”29
The defendant’s right to counsel itself is personal and individuated
in a number of ways. Counsel’s duties of loyalty, confidentiality, and
competence run to the individual defendant.30 The defendant owns
them, even after his death,31 and the attorney’s employer cannot
interfere with them.32 Even attorneys for future defendants lack
standing to enforce the defendants’ rights until their clients actually
retain them.33
Of particular importance in the misdemeanor context is the
personal, individuated nature of the trial waiver. Because the

28. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975).
29. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 35 (1972) (quoting Dean Edward
Barrett).
30. United States v. Smith, 454 F.3d 707, 713 (7th Cir. 2006) (attorney-client
privilege is personal and belongs solely to the client and cannot be asserted by
anyone else); Portman v. County of Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 1993)
(attorney lacked standing to assert Sixth Amendment challenge to statute because
the right to effective counsel is personal to criminal defendants).
31. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998) (attorney-client
privilege survives death of client).
32. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 321–22 (1981) (public defender’s
loyalties ran to client, not to the Public Defender’s Office, and therefore defender
was not acting under color of law for the purposes of § 1983).
33. Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125 (2004) (appellate attorneys lacked standing
to challenge law denying defendants appellate counsel until they had actual clients).
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misdemeanor system runs largely on pleas, as does the criminal
system more generally,34 the extent to which waivers reflect individual
knowledge, choice, and culpability is crucial to the overall legitimacy
of the process. Waivers must be “intentional,”35 meaning that the
individual defendant must subjectively intend to plead.36 The
Supreme Court has held that the decision to plead guilty is personal
to the defendant; like the waiver of counsel, it requires his “express
personal consent” and no one else can do it for him.37 At the outer
limit, a defendant who denies culpability may still choose to plead,
but even here the defendant personally makes the decision in light of
his options and desires.38 This insistence that waiver is something
only a defendant can personally choose keeps the plea system
anchored in individuation: it embodies the idea that each and every
defendant who pleads is still being treated as a unique individual on
the merits of his or her case.
D. Aggregation at Sentencing
These core commitments to individuation have generated a robust
debate in the area of sentencing, particularly with respect to the
advent of sentencing guidelines. On the one hand, at least in theory,
the imposition of punishment is a highly individuated process. As the
Court recently put it, “[t]he heart of the retribution rationale is that a
criminal sentence must be directly related to the personal culpability
of the criminal offender.”39 On the other hand, determinate
sentencing is a form of aggregation: the categorical determination of

34. Between 90–95% of felony convictions are the result of a guilty plea. See
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FELONY SENTENCES IN
STATE COURT, 2006—STATISTICAL TABLES (2009), available at http://www.bjs.gov/
content/pub/pdf/fssc06st.pdf; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE PRICE OF
FREEDOM: BAIL AND PRETRIAL DETENTION OF LOW INCOME NONFELONY
DEFENDANTS IN NEW YORK CITY 3 (2010), available at http://www.hrw.org/
sites/default/files/reports/us1210webwcover_0.pdf (99.6% of misdemeanants plead
guilty).
35. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
36. Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 7 (1966) (invalidating plea because defendant’s
statements indicated that he lacked intent to waive trial).
37. Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 247–48 (2008) (contrasting trial
waivers with consent to have a magistrate judge preside over voir dire, to which
defense counsel can agree without the defendant’s personal consent).
38. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 32, 37–38 (1970) (emphasizing Alford’s
personal “view,” “desire” and “choice” to plead guilty).
39. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2028 (2010) (quoting Tison v. Arizona, 481
U.S. 137, 149 (1987)).
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punishment based on offense category and criminal history insensitive
to defendants’ individuated characteristics.40 Years ago, Albert
Alschuler mourned this trend towards aggregation, arguing that “the
movement from individualized to aggregated sentences . . . has
marked a backward step in the search for just criminal
punishments.”41 He maintained further that:
Increased aggregation seems characteristic of current legal and
social thought, and what I have called “the bottom-line collectivistempirical mentality” now seems to threaten traditional concepts of
individual worth and entitlement.
Commentators speak
misleadingly of “group rights.” Judges determine the scope of legal
rules, not by examining the circumstances of individual cases, but by
speculating about the customary behavior of large groups.42

Sentencing law also varies its demand for individuation depending
on the seriousness of the offense. Not surprisingly, individuation
requirements are highest in death penalty doctrine. “In capital cases,
the Constitution demands that the punishment be tailored both to the
nature of the crime itself and to the defendant’s ‘personal
responsibility and moral guilt.’”43 To be fair, a capital sentencing
scheme must treat each person convicted of a capital offense with that
“degree of respect due the uniqueness of the individual . . . .”44 In
capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the
Eighth Amendment requires consideration of the character and
record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the
particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the
process of inflicting the penalty of death.45 Indeed, when the Court
invalidated the death penalty with respect to defendants who
committed offenses when they were minors, Justice O’Connor
dissented, arguing that a flat rule based on age was inconsistent with
the precept that “[t]he criminal justice system . . . provides for
individualized consideration of each defendant.”46

40. SCHAUER, supra note 13, at 257 (“The Sentencing Guidelines stand as a
repudiation of this particularistic understanding of the nature of law [and] represent a
triumph of generalization over individuation.”).
41. Albert Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less
Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 901, 902 (1991).
42. Id. at 904.
43. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 589 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)
(quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982)).
44. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (plurality opinion).
45. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976).
46. Roper, 543 U.S. at 620 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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Categorical sentencing is constitutionally permissible in non-capital
cases,47 and with respect to these cases the Court has held that lighter
punishments require less individuation. This linkage is embodied in
the rule of Scott v. Illinois, in which the Court held that misdemeanor
defendants who are not sentenced to prison are not entitled to
counsel.48 Because counsel is the primary guarantor of accuracy and
individuation,49 Scott effectively approved reduced individuation
where there is minimal punishment.
E.

Permissible Procedural Aggregation

In addition to sentencing, criminal law tolerates a variety of
procedural forms of aggregation with respect to non-guilt issues.
Brandon Garrett catalogues these to include the appointment of
special masters to investigate repeated forensic fraud, aggregate
examinations of death penalty convictions for racial disparities,
aggregate claims of insufficient defense representation, and
consolidated federal habeas corpus petitions.50 Garrett argues that
such procedural case aggregations can improve accuracy and justice,
and he advocates for a greater role for aggregate decision making.
Importantly, Garrett makes clear that he is addressing procedural
aggregation on “limited issues—criminal procedural rights distinct
from individual questions of guilt . . . .”51 With the exception of group
crimes, Garrett agrees that aggregation is never appropriate on the
underlying question of criminal liability and that guilt determinations
“must be highly individualized.”52
Similarly, Adam Zimmerman and David Jaros argue for greater
procedural aggregation at sentencing in large-scale fraud and
environmental criminal cases with numerous victims.53 In such cases,
prosecutors in effect preside over something akin to a “criminal class
action,” in which a victim class seeks damages—in the form of

47. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 (noting that individuation in non-capital cases
reflects “simply enlightened policy rather than a constitutional imperative”).
48. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
49. See Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 665 (2002) (deeming “conviction [to
be] credited as reliable because the defendant had access to the ‘guiding hand of
counsel’” (quoting Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 40 (1972))).
50. Brandon Garrett, Aggregation in Criminal Law, 95 CAL. L. REV. 383 (2007).
51. Id. at 387.
52. Id. at 394.
53. Adam S. Zimmerman & David M. Jaros, The Criminal Class Action, 159 U.
PA. L. REV. 1385 (2011).
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restitution—from a single defendant.54 Like Garrett, Zimmerman
and Jaros skirt the question of aggregation on liability issues,
maintaining only that the sentencing process in these types of cases
should be more responsive to the needs of the victim class.
In sum, there is limited conceptual room for aggregation in the
criminal system. It exists in various forms at sentencing, and in
connection with procedures that address non-liability issues such as
forensic accuracy or widespread rights violations. On the core issue
of criminal guilt, however, the universally accepted position is that
aggregation is impermissible. The remainder of this Article explores
how, despite this bedrock view, the urban misdemeanor process
effectively imposes convictions in the aggregate by permitting the
erosion and evasion of individuating rules and procedures.
II. INFORMAL AGGREGATION
The informal aggregations of the criminal system come in many
flavors and go by many names, from “actuarial”55 policing to racial
profiling, “meet ‘em and plead ‘em” lawyering, categorical
sentencing, and the catch-all, “assembly line justice.”56 They tend to
render substantive decisions based on categorical generalizations or
institutional policies in ways that sideline individual defendant
characteristics, the most important being the factual question of
whether that particular defendant actually committed a particular
crime.57 Some aggregations represent valid forms of decision making

54. Zimmerman and Jaros argue that victims in these classes are currently
underserved by the lack of formal aggregation at the sentencing stage, and that they
deserve similar sorts of representation and oversight protections that their civil
counterparts receive in a formal class action setting. Id. at 398–99.
55. See generally BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING,
POLICING AND PUNISHING IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE (2007) (“[P]rediction instruments
increasingly determine individual outcomes in our policing, law enforcement, and
punishment practices.”); see also Malcolm Feeley & Jonathan Simon, Actuarial
Justice: The Emerging New Criminal Law, in THE FUTURES OF CRIMINOLOGY 173
(1994) (describing actuarial justice as “concerned with techniques for identifying,
classifying and managing groups” and contrasting it with the “Old Penology [that] is
rooted in a concern for individuals, and preoccupied with such concepts as guilt”).
56. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 36 (1972).
57. As Harcourt points out, all decisionmaking is categorical in the broadest sense
that all conclusions require an inferential step. HARCOURT, supra note 55, at 18
(quoting Lawrence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal
Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1330 n.2 (1971)) (“[A]ll factual evidence is
ultimately ‘statistical,’ and all legal proof ultimately ‘probabilistic,’ in the
epistemological sense that no conclusion can ever be drawn from empirical data
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in their own right; some are illegal.58 They are informal in the sense
that the groupings are not created or validated by law or judicial
order; unlike a civil class action, there is no legally binding effect on
other class members.59 Rather, they are decisional tendencies that
have come to characterize the petty criminal process in lasting and
predictable ways. They stem from a wide variety of sources, from
public policies like order maintenance policing to the institutional
pressures on public defense offices to resolve heavy caseloads.60
Many of them are well-known features of the misdemeanor process.
But because they are not formal rules that bind defendants as a class,
they are rarely conceptualized as triggering the doctrinal and
functional problems of class-based legal decision making.61
In theory, the criminal process has numerous individuating
procedures and opportunities that serve as antidotes to informal
aggregation. A prosecutor screens police arrest decisions before
filing charges to ensure that the particular defendant warrants
prosecution.62 Defense lawyers not only evaluate cases but also create
individual relationships with defendants to ensure that they
understand their own cases and that their decisions are honored.63
Courts provide individual hearings—plea colloquies to establish
knowing and voluntary pleas, or trials to establish factual guilt. The
defendant himself has opportunities to express his individuality: to
confer with a lawyer unfettered by conflicts; to testify at trial; to
confront the witnesses against him; to knowingly and intelligently

without some step of inductive inference—even if only an inference that things are
usually what they are perceived to be.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
58. See SCHAUER, supra note 13, at 176–79 (distinguishing permissible from
impermissible racial profiling).
59. Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (authorizing class actions with binding effects on
class members).
60. See, e.g., ROBERT C. BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF.
LAWYERS, MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE: THE TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA’S
BROKEN MISDEMEANOR COURTS (2009); J.D. King, Procedural Justice, Collateral
Consequences, and the Adjudication of Misdemeanors, in THE PROSECUTOR IN
TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 20–36 (Erik Luna & Marianne Wade eds., 2011);
Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the
Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 282 (2011).
61. E.g., Garrett, supra note 50, at 396 (distinguishing institutional practices from
formal aggregation and calling them “institutional systemization”).
62. Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN.
L. REV. 29, 31–32 (2002).
63. Alexandra Natapoff, Speechless: The Silencing of Criminal Defendants, 80
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1449, 1469–75 (2005) (describing counsel’s various functions).
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consent to a plea; to allocute at sentencing; and to self-represent.64 To
be sure, aggregating features may influence each of these stages:
generic prosecutorial policies, defense lack of resources, pressures on
defendants to plead. But the mere existence of some aggregation or
generalization is not lethal. The ideal is procedurally constructed to
counter those tendencies and to provide a variety of individuating
guarantees that the case is being decided on the evidence and in ways
that the particular defendant understands and chooses.
The misdemeanor system, however, has largely abandoned the
individuated ideal. The scale of misdemeanor dockets in conjunction
with their speed and lack of adversarial resources make aggregation
the norm. While even serious cases and well-resourced defendants
are affected by aggregation,65 those cases typically receive higher
levels of scrutiny and greater adherence to individuating procedures.
Such cases can thus be decided more closely to the merits and
according to law, indulging in what Lawrence Friedman once referred
to as the “luxury of slow, individuated justice.”66 By contrast,
misdemeanors comprise the massive bottom of a penal pyramid
where cases are processed quickly, in bulk, and where aggregation
tendencies dominate.67
William Stuntz made a similar point about the variable and
hierarchical effect of law itself: “For crimes at the top of the severity
scale, law defines both criminal liability and punishment;” for less
serious offenses at the bottom, prosecutorial overcharging and
bargaining are the real drivers.68 In the same way, for the most
serious cases and the best-resourced defendants, we see the
individuation ideal at its strongest: cases are scrutinized on the merits
one by one, criminal procedures are honored, and what defendants
know and choose can actually affect case outcomes.69 Duke lacrosse
64. See supra Part I.
65. Perhaps most famously by the impact of racial reasoning. See McCleskey v.
Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 308 (1987) (acknowledging Baldus study documenting the
influence of race in capital case outcomes).
66. Lawrence M. Friedman, Legal Rules and the Process of Social Change, 19
STAN. L. REV. 786, 792 (1967) (distinguishing between clear cut rules of general
application and discretionary rules that require specific factfinding).
67. Natapoff, supra note 4.
68. William Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow,
117 HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2564 (2004).
69. See, e.g., ALAN DERSHOWITZ, REASONABLE DOUBTS: THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM AND THE O.J. SIMPSON CASE (Touchstone 1997) (describing the anatomy of
this well-litigated murder case). Of course, even the most serious cases can be
affected by categorical approaches. See MEDWED, supra note 8, at 22–25 (describing

NATAPOFF_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

AGGREGATION & MISDEMEANORS

6/26/2013 8:34 PM

1061

player Reade Seligmann, whose high-powered defense team
exonerated him from rape allegations, acknowledged his privileged
spot at the top of that pyramid: “This entire experience has opened
my eyes up to a tragic world of injustice I never knew existed . . . . If
police officers and a district attorney can systematically railroad us
with absolutely no evidence whatsoever, I can’t imagine what they’d
do to people who do not have the resources to defend themselves.”70
Because generalized policies and aggregations dominate the
misdemeanor system at each stage, commitments to individuation are
repetitively weakened as defendants move through the process. The
aggregate processing habits of prosecutors and public defenders
reinforce group-based decision making peculiar to policing. Mass
court processes validate and reinforce cookie-cutter plea bargaining.71
By the end, when defendants are legally convicted, there may have
been little or no individuated basis for that pronouncement of guilt.
The next Part surveys the mechanics of that process, briefly
examining each stage of the misdemeanor system to identify its
aggregative characteristics and their potential effects on resulting
convictions.
III. INFORMAL AGGREGATION IN THE URBAN MISDEMEANOR
PROCESS
A. Policing
The police decision to stop and/or arrest a person is the threshold
selection function of the criminal process. It is increasingly clear that
urban police often make such decisions based not on evidence of
individual criminal behavior, but rather on group characteristics and
location. The aggregations are iterative: the aggregate qualities of
stop and frisk policies have ripple effects on the arrest process, and
the arrest process itself is heavily shaped by generalized decision
making.

prosecutorial overreliance on police and institutional tunnel vision that leads to
wrongful convictions).
70. Duff Wilson & David Barstow, All Charges Dropped in Duke Case, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 12, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/02/us/12duke.html.
71. See Natapoff, Misdemeanors, supra note 3, at 1331–47 (describing
misdemeanor process).
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Aggregation in Stops

The so-called “stop and frisk” phenomenon has become infamous
for its aggregate qualities, particularly with respect to race. In New
York, the number of stops of young black men citywide in 2011
actually exceeded the total number of young black men in the city
(168,126 as compared to 158,406).72 In Brownsville—a high-crime,
largely African American neighborhood in Brooklyn—the
phenomenon is even more intense. In an area that is approximately
eight blocks wide with 14,000 residents, police made 52,000 stops in
Brownsville between 2006 and 2010, which amounted to nearly one
stop per year for each resident.73 Accordingly, living in Brownsville,
or being a young black male in New York, has become a salient
grouping mechanism triggering the likelihood of police action.
Such practices that sweep entire groups of people into the criminal
process are widely understood as class-wide policies that are not
centrally driven by individuated considerations.74 Bernard Harcourt
and Tracey Meares explain that this is in some ways inevitable
because suspicion itself is a “probabilistic concept” that is almost
always generated by “group-based-type behavior”:75
For the most part, suspicion attaches to group-based traits,
conditions, and behaviors; the police identify sets of individuals with
motives, individuals who match a drug-courier profile, individuals

72. N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, STOP-AND-FRISK 2011, at 7 (2012), available at
http://www.nyclu.org/files/publications/NYCLU_2011_Stop-and-Frisk_Report.pdf.
While black and Latino males between the ages of 14 and 24 account for
only 4.7 percent of the city’s population, they accounted for 41.6 percent of
those stopped [in 2011]. By contrast, white males between the ages 14 and
24 make up 2 percent of the city’s population but accounted for 3.8 percent
of stops.

Id.
73. Ray Rivera, Al Baker & Janet Roberts, A Few Blocks, 4 Years, 52,000 Police
N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/12/
nyregion/12frisk.html (documenting police stop rate of 93 stops per 100 residents, as
compared to a 7:100 stop rate in the rest of the city).
74. See Second Amended Class Action Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive
Relief and Individual Damages ¶¶ 2–3, Floyd v. City of New York, 813 F. Supp. 2d
417 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 2008) (No. 08 Civ. 01034) (civil rights class action alleging that
the NYPD practice of stopping and frisking predominantly African American and
Latino young men is illegal for lack of reasonable suspicion and because it is
motivated by race).
75. Bernard E. Harcourt & Tracey L. Meares, Randomization and the Fourth
Amendment, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 809, 811 (2011).

Stops,
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who fit an eye-witness description, individuals who are in a specific
location, or individuals who have the same blood type.76

This fact—that all inferences involve aggregate generalizations—
has manifested in order maintenance policing in a particularly
destructive way. As Harcourt and Meares put it, the “aggregation of
[demography and geography] helps to ‘race’ crime in a particular
way,”77 such that young black men in cities all over the country
automatically trigger “suspicion.”78
Of course, police are not permitted by law to stop entire classes of
people without evidence,79 and these stops are typically justified by
individuated-sounding criteria. The actual reasons that New York
police assert for stopping individuals, however, are themselves heavily
dominated by generalized categories including time of day, highcrime location, and “furtive movements.”80 Such criteria are not
themselves unique characteristics of criminal actors. Instead, they are
widely applicable, facially innocent criteria that could apply to almost
anyone in those neighborhoods.81 Accordingly, even when police
articulate such reasons above and beyond mere racial and
neighborhood profiling, they are still effectively pursuing a class-wide
policy because those reasons are not themselves individuated. In this
way, the generalized nature of the selection criteria permits an
aggregate policy to masquerade as an individualized one.

2.

Aggregation in Arrests

Arrests require more evidence than stops, and it is often assumed
that while stops may be made in the aggregate, the decision to arrest
is individuated to the suspect based on evidence of crime. The idea is
that while police might stop and frisk based on race and
neighborhood, they wouldn’t actually arrest someone if he hadn’t

76. Id. at 813.
77. Id. at 854.
78. Id. at 858–59.
79. Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000).
80. Most Frequently Listed Reasons for Stops: Citywide, Jan. 1, 2006–Dec. 31,
2006, N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, http://www.nyclu.org/files/2006_Top_Five_
Reasons.pdf (last visited May 13, 2013).
81. Amanda Geller & Jeffrey Fagan, Pot as Pretext: Marijuana, Race and the
New Disorder in New York City Street Policing, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 591,
595 (2010), available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1740-1461.
2010.01190.x/pdf (noting that in New York “only about 20 percent of all stops are
based on specific subject descriptions”).
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done something wrong.82
In this way, the demographic and
geographic aggregations of the stop-and-frisk phenomenon are
thought to be cured by the heightened evidentiary standards of the
arrest process.
Three pending civil rights lawsuits in New York illustrate the
fallacy of that assumption. In Stinson v. City of New York, plaintiffs
allege a departmental practice of issuing summons without probable
cause, driven by an NYPD quota requirement.83 In Gomez-Garcia v.
New York City Police Department, plaintiffs challenge the NYPD
practice of making a full custodial arrest for marijuana possession
when New York law requires that individuals possessing less than
twenty-five grams of marijuana be issued a Desk Appearance Ticket,
akin to a traffic ticket.84 In Davis v. City of New York, plaintiffs
challenge the legality of the NYPD policy of stopping and arresting
public housing residents for trespassing.85
Each of these lawsuits describes a policy that calls into question the
individuated evidentiary validity of arrests. Or to put it another way,
they challenge the assumption that arrests are actually based on
probable cause that the individual arrestee committed a crime,
suggesting that arrests are in fact driven by many of the same
aggregating tendencies as the stop and frisk process. Stinson is the
most direct, alleging that police simply issue summons without
probable cause in order to meet a departmental arrest quota.86 Their
proof lies in the high rate of summons dismissals for lack of probable
cause.87 To the extent that the subsequent dismissal process does not

82. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26 (1968) (distinguishing Terry stops from
arrests, noting that “[a]n arrest is a wholly different kind of intrusion upon individual
freedom from a limited search for weapons, and the interests each is designed to
serve are likewise quite different[;] [a]n arrest is the initial stage of a criminal
prosecution”).
83. Stinson v. City of New York, 282 F.R.D. 360 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (granting class
certification).
84. Verified Complaint, Gomez-Garcia v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, No. 0451000-2012
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 22, 2012), available at http://www.legal-aid.org/
media/157211/06222012_marijuana_complaint.pdf.
85. Amended Complaint, Davis v. City of New York, No. 10 Civ. 0699 (SAS)
(S.D.N.Y. May 27, 2011); see also Complaint, Ligon v. City of New York, No. 12 Civ.
2274 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2012) (challenging NY police program “Operation Clean
Halls” in which police stop, search, and arrest residents of public housing projects
typically for the offense of trespassing).
86. Stinson, 282 F.R.D. at 363.
87. Id. at 366–65.
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catch the errors, cases are being generated based on arrests that lack
probable cause.
In Gomez-Garcia, the allegation is that police are arresting people
for possessing marijuana in public view when in fact police are
arresting people who may have marijuana on their person (not a
criminal offense) but only bring it into public view when the police
order them to do so.88 These arrests are therefore based on “crimes”
generated by police officers themselves. More generally, Amanda
Geller and Jeff Fagan have explained that despite the
decriminalization of minor marijuana possession, the NYPD has
“doubled down” on marijuana arrests as part of its order maintenance
policing, and that marijuana arrest patterns exhibit many of the same
racial and geographic biases that stop patterns do.89
Finally, the Davis plaintiffs challenge the NYPD policy of arresting
residents of public housing projects for trespassing when those
individuals are often legally on the premises and therefore innocent.90
The accuracy of plaintiffs’ claim was recently validated when the
Bronx District Attorney’s office announced its intention to stop
prosecuting such cases without requiring additional evidence from the
police.91 In effect, the DA agreed that those arrests lacked probable
cause.
New York aside, there are many reasons to question more
generally whether urban misdemeanor arrests are reliable indicators
of individuated probable cause and thus whether they counter the
aggregative tendencies of stop and frisk. Urban police arrest
individuals for all sorts of policy reasons unrelated to probable cause:
to clear a street corner, to establish authority, or to send a message in

88. Verified Complaint ¶2, Gomez-Garcia v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, No. 04510002012 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 22, 2012).
89. Geller & Fagan, supra note 81, at 593-95. Stop and arrest patterns were not
identical, however. See id. at 605–07 (many precincts that recorded high marijuana
arrests recorded fewer marijuana stops).
90. Amended Complaint, Davis v. City of New York, No. 10 Civ. 0699 (SAS)
(S.D.N.Y. May 27, 2011); see also Jeffrey Fagan, Garth Davies & Adam Carlis, Race
and Selective Enforcement in Public Housing (Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal
Theory Working Paper Grp., Paper No. 12-314, 2012), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2133384 (describing “wholesale” trespassing enforcement
policies in public housing and noting that N.Y. law “places almost no barriers
between the police officer and a trespass arrest”).
91. Joseph Goldstein, Prosecutor Deals Blow to Stop-and-Frisk Tactic, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 25, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/26/nyregion/in-the-bronxresistance-to-prosecuting-stop-and-frisk-arrests.html.
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a high-crime neighborhood.92 As sociologist and former police officer
Peter Moskos describes it, “[o]n street corners in Baltimore’s Eastern
District, people—usually young black males involved with drugs—are
arrested when they talk back to police or refuse to obey a police
officer’s orders to move. . . . These lockups are used by police to
assert authority or get criminals off the street.”93 Similarly, Wesley
Skogan and Tracey Meares described how police may make unlawful
arrests in pursuit of other policy goals:
[O]fficers sometimes bend rules because they simply want an
individual that they have identified as a lawbreaker to get his or her
“due” in a sort of retributive justice sense. Officers can be quite
strategic in pursuing these goals, including risking a bit of censure
when they have other forms of evidence to fall back on if their
actions are challenged. Several studies found that officers intent on
seizing contraband, disrupting illicit networks, or asserting their
authority on the street freely violated the rules because their goal
was not principally to secure an individual conviction.94

In sum, urban police decisions to stop individuals are heavily
conditioned by aggregate factors such as race, neighborhood, and
order maintenance policies. When those stops turn into arrests, there
are weak guarantees that those arrests are based on the discovery of
evidence: arrest decisions are similarly shaped by aggregate policies
designed to maintain order and police authority that are not specific
to the individuals being arrested. These aggregating tendencies of the
initial selection decisions of the petty criminal system set the stage for
the rest of the process.
B.

Bail

Once arrested, suspects may be released, required to pay bail, or
detained. The concept of bail is that a defendant who poses a flight
risk and/or a risk to the community may be forced to post a monetary
bond or remain in jail.95 In theory, this practice requires an
individuated factual determination regarding the two issues of flight
and risk. Many jurisdictions, however, maintain bail schedules that

92. See Natapoff, Misdemeanors, supra note 3, at 1328 (describing in more detail
the lack of probable cause in urban arrest policies).
93. PETER MOSKOS, COP IN THE HOOD: MY YEAR POLICING BALTIMORE’S
EASTERN DISTRICT 119–20, 155 (2008).
94. Wesley G. Skogan & Tracey L. Meares, Lawful Policing, 593 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 66, 71 (2004).
95. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
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automatically set bail amounts based on the nature of the offense,
without regard to the defendant’s particular characteristics.96 More
generally, studies show that courts routinely make categorical bail
decisions, being more likely to detain and/or impose higher bail
amounts on racial minorities and the poor.97 Since defendants are
often unrepresented in this process, there is no attorney to ensure
that the specifics of the defendant’s situation are considered.98
While bail technically does not go to substantive questions of guilt,
it can powerfully influence whether a defendant pleads guilty. An
incarcerated defendant is more likely to suffer personal and economic
hardship pending trial, less able to work with a lawyer to defend her
case, and thus more likely to take a deal.99 Accordingly, the
aggregating tendencies of the bail process contribute in practice to the
ultimate question of who will sustain a criminal conviction.
C.

Prosecutorial Screening

Institutionally speaking, the job of deciding who shall be formally
charged with a crime belongs to prosecutors.100 Central to the
prosecutor’s task is the screening of police arrest decisions and sorting
through which cases should proceed as formal criminal cases.101 This
is supposed to be an individuated inquiry on a number of fronts:
prosecutors consider the evidence, but also make equitable and policy
decisions about what cases deserve prosecution.102

96. Lindsey Carlson, Bail Schedules: A Violation of Judicial Discretion?, 26
CRIM. JUST., Spring 2011, at 12, 15.
97. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Joel Waldfogel, A Market Test for Race Discrimination
in Bail Setting, 46 STAN. L. REV. 987 (1994); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 34,
at 3 (2010). Malcolm Feeley and Jonathan Simon cite preventive detention as a
“practice[] that most clearly exemplifies the qualities of actuarial justice” due to its
reliance on categorical information and “collective algorithm[s].” Feeley & Simon,
supra note 55, at 175–77.
98. Douglas Colbert, Prosecution Without Representation, 59 BUFF. L. REV. 333,
386–87 (2011) (half of all jurisdictions provide no counsel at bail and defendants may
remain incarcerated for one to four weeks or more).
99. See Natapoff, Misdemeanors, supra note 3, at 1343–47 (documenting the
pressure that pre-trial detention exerts on defendants to plead guilty).
100. See United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 124 (1979) (“Whether to
prosecute and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury are decisions that
generally rest in the prosecutor’s discretion.”). In lower courts, police may have the
authority to file charging documents in minor cases. See Surell Brady, Arrests
Without Prosecution and the Fourth Amendment, 59 MD. L. REV. 1, 21–22 (2000).
101. Bordenkirscher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978).
102. Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision
Not to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655 (2010).
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With respect to minor offenses, however, prosecutors in some
jurisdictions forgo the screening inquiry and convert arrests into
charges more or less automatically. This fact is reflected in low rates
at which prosecutors decline cases. In New York and Iowa, for
example, Josh Bowers found declination rates for certain minor
offenses as low as 2% or less, meaning that 98% of those police arrest
decisions converted to criminal charges.103 A Vera Institute study
found similarly low prosecutorial declination rates in misdemeanor
drug cases in North Carolina.104 As Surell Brady put it, because
prosecutors spend so little effort screening cases before trial, “an
individual’s loss of freedom and the prosecutorial merit of most of
those cases stand or fall solely on a police officer’s judgment about
the legal sufficiency of the evidence and of the rules of law applicable
to the cited offense(s), and on the officer’s judgment about the merit
of an individual case from a public policy perspective.”105 Prosecutors
typically lavish more scrutiny and attention on serious charges and
therefore make more granular judgments about which cases to
prosecute and which ones to decline. By contrast, in petty cases
where stakes are low and caseloads are heavy, prosecutors tend to
rely on and defer more to initial police decisions.106
To be sure, declination rates vary widely by jurisdiction and many
low-level arrests never lead to anything more than a night or two in
jail.107 But where declination rates are low and prosecutors fail to
screen, the aggregative tendencies of arrest decisions translate
directly into aggregate prosecutorial decisions.

103. Id. at 1716–18.
104. Racial Disparities in the Criminal Justice System: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
111th Cong. 32 (2009) (statement of Wayne S. McKenzie, Director, Prosecution &
Racial Justice Program, Vera Inst. of Justice), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/
hearings/printers/111th/111-78_53093.PDF.
105. Brady, supra note 100, at 22.
106. Bowers, supra note 102.
107. Edward Ericson Jr., Copping Out: A City Council Report on False Arrests by
Baltimore Police Fails to Address the Root of the Problem, BALT. CITY PAPER, Oct.
5, 2005, http://www2.citypaper.com/film/story.asp?id=10980 (one third of Baltimore
loitering arrests dismissed). Compare Bowers, supra note 102 (reporting NY
marijuana declination rates at less than 10 percent), with Issa Kohler-Hausmann,
Misdemeanor Justice: The Penal Logic of Dismissal 13 (2012) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, New York University) (on file with author) (45% of all NY
misdemeanor arrests result in dismissal).
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D. Defense Counsel: “Meet ‘Em and Plead ‘Em” Lawyering
When all else fails, the American criminal process depends on
defense counsel to ensure that defendants are treated as individuals.
It is defense counsel’s job to challenge indiscriminate arrest and
charging decisions, to debunk existing evidence, ferret out new facts,
and generally to ensure that individuating procedural rules protect
her client.108 Just as important, it is counsel’s responsibility to protect
cognitive and dignitary aspects of individuation: to talk to her client,
to hear what he has to say about his case, and to educate him about
his choices.109
In the current climate of overworked public defenders and massive
misdemeanor dockets, defense counsel cannot meaningfully perform
these individuating functions. For example, a 2009 report entitled
Minor Crimes, Massive Waste studied misdemeanor dockets across
the country.110 In some jurisdictions, the report found misdemeanor
caseloads in the many hundreds or even thousands, in which
attorneys literally had minutes to resolve each case.111 The results of
the overload included attorney incompetence, the inability to consult
with clients and prepare cases, and other violations of the attorneys’
ethical obligations.112 Numerous other studies and scholars have
come to the same conclusion, namely, that scale of misdemeanor
dockets and caseloads have largely eviscerated the individuating
function of defense counsel.113
The right-to-counsel literature has amassed a long list of the
harmful consequences that flow from overloaded dockets and the
attendant breakdown of the defense function. To that list we can now
add one more item. We rely on the defense function to stem the
trend towards aggregation that characterizes the modern criminal
108. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 84 (1988) (“[I]t is through counsel that all other
rights of the accused are protected.”).
109. Clark D. Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients: Thinking About Law as
Language, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2459 (1989); see also Brady v. United States, 397 U.S.
742, 754 (1970) (noting crucial role of advice of counsel in dissipating coercive effects
of plea bargaining).
110. BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., supra note 60.
111. Id. at 21.
112. Id. at 22–24.
113. AM. BAR ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS,
GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE
(2004); MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES
IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT (1979) (describing thin process and lack of
representation in New Haven misdemeanor courts); Ian Weinstein, The Adjudication
of Minor Offenses in New York City, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1157, 1158 (2004).
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process, to turn defendants into individuals before the law even if the
police and prosecutors have failed to do so. By overloading public
defenders, we prevent them from fulfilling their individuating
function and ensure that the wave of aggregation proceeds
uninterrupted.114
E.

Off-the-Rack Plea Bargains

Where prosecutors fail to screen and defense attorneys lack time to
insist on individuation, the plea process becomes a categorical
exercise. Prosecutors make standard offers based on the offense of
arrest, and bargains are struck based on the institutional habits of the
local jurisdiction.
The aggregative impact of plea bargaining is two-fold. Most
importantly, institutional pressure to plead guilty rather than litigate
converts defendants into criminals in bulk. The pervasive assumption
that cases will plead out means that everyone is expected to sustain
some sort of conviction; the only thing left to negotiate is the name of
the crime and the precise punishment.
Second, the extent of punishment is also determined largely in the
aggregate, by reference to the local “price” for certain offenses. This
categorical quality of plea bargaining has been observed even in the
felony context. As William Stuntz wrote, plea bargains are typically
set based on “customary practices” and repeat players are “likely to
have a good sense of the ‘market price’ for any particular case.”115 In
this felony model, prosecutors and defense attorneys bargain in the
shadow of customary prices for certain kinds of offenses, adjusting
outcomes based on the individuating circumstances of a particular
case.
In petty cases, by contrast, plea bargains take place in bulk,
detached from the facts and circumstances of individual cases and are
therefore more heavily determined by the going rate. As Malcolm
Feeley eloquently put it, “[t]he reality of American [misdemeanor
justice] . . . is more akin to modern supermarkets in which prices for

114. I discuss the inherently limited ability of misdemeanor defense counsel to
ensure fairness at greater length in Natapoff, Gideon Skepticism, supra note 3.
115. Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE
L.J. 1909, 1923–24 (1992) (asserting that plea bargains are “individualized” and not
“mass marketed”); see also id. at 1933 (plea bargaining constrained by “customary
‘market’ prices’”); Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial,
117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2481, 2482 n.78, 2515 (2004) (noting that jurisdictions have
customary “rates” for recurring cases and situations).
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various commodities have been clearly established and labeled in
advance.”116 In one New York borough, for example, it is the practice
for prosecutors always to offer a deferred prosecution (known as an
“Adjournment in Contemplation of Dismissal” (ACD)) to first-time
marijuana arrestees and for judges to accept such dispositions, even
where defendants appear to be innocent and outright dismissal would
therefore be appropriate.117 In the South Bronx, police use a
boilerplate complaint to charge trespassing cases so that the factual
record and charge is standardized, and defendants almost universally
plead to light sentences.118 In Salt Lake City, prosecutors in domestic
violence cases tell the court that they are seeking the “standard
package,” which includes a uniform charge bargain and sentence.119
In these ways, the aggregate practices of misdemeanor prosecutors
and defenses attorneys result in predictable, standardized
pronouncements of guilt and punishment. Because those attorneys
lack time and incentives to collect all but the most superficial
information about cases, those standardized pleas cannot be assumed
to reflect defendant culpability, the availability of defenses, or the
strength of the evidence. Instead, these convictions are better
understood as a product of local jurisdiction practices and all the
other institutional, aggregative practices that generated the case in
the first place.
F.

Judges and the Mass Court Process

Although the individuating influence of the judge is less in an
adversarial than an inquisitorial system, American judges still
theoretically play an important part in ensuring that cases are handled
on the merits and defendants are treated as unique individuals. At
trial, judges not only enforce the rules, but also may be called on after
the fact to decide the sufficiency of the evidence—that is, whether

116. FEELEY, supra note 113, at 187.
117. See, e.g., Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 107, at 16–17 (describing “normative
practice” in New York borough).
118. M. Chris Fabricant, Rousting the Cops: One Man Stands Up to the NYPD’s
Apartheid-Like Trespassing Crackdown, VILLAGE VOICE, Oct. 30, 2007,
http://www.villagevoice.com/2007-10-30/news/rousting-the-cops/.
119. Rekha Mirchandani, What’s So Special About Specialized Courts? The State
and Social Change in Salt Lake City’s Domestic Violence Court, 39 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 379, 397 (2005); see also Jeannie Suk, Criminal Law Comes Home, 116 YALE
L.J. 2, 56 (2006) (noting that in domestic violence cases the “final order of protection
is so common that it is plausible to consider it a standard disposition sought by
prosecutors”).
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there was enough evidence adduced at trial to find a particular
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.120 More frequently,
judges presiding over guilty pleas must establish a factual basis for the
plea, and the knowing and voluntary nature of the plea by directly
addressing the defendant and asking him personal questions.121
In his famous study of the lower court process, Malcolm Feeley
concluded that misdemeanor judges do not play this individuating
role; rather, such courts process defendants through in bulk with little
or no attention to specific facts or defendant understanding. Feeley
describes the typical court proceeding as follows:
Arrestees were arraigned in groups and informed of their rights en
masse. At times the arrestees were not even aware that they are
being addressed. Judges did not always look at them, and even if a
judge made an effort to be heard, he could not always be understood
over the constant din of the courtroom. . . . While a few cases took
up as much as a minute or two of the court’s time . . . the
overwhelming majority of cases took just a few seconds.122

Numerous authors have replicated Feeley’s conclusions, noting
that lower court processes are non-individuated and insensitive to
evidence.123 As Josh Bowers puts it, the misdemeanor process is one
in which “[g]uilt is typically presumed in a process too rough-andready for the parties to develop and consider it properly.”124
To date, courts have not recognized aggregation per se as a threat
to the validity of pleas. The Ninth Circuit, for example, recently
concluded that the mere lack of an individuated plea procedure does
not violate due process.125 The Court upheld the constitutionality of a
mass plea process conducted in Arizona under the auspices of the
“Operation Streamline” program. In that program, “a magistrate
judge is assigned to preside over a group hearing of fifty to seventy
defendants charged with petty misdemeanor violations of illegal
entry. The hearing combines the defendants’ initial appearances,
guilty pleas, and sentencing hearings into one proceeding.”126 The
Ninth Circuit concluded that because defendants were counseled and

120. FED. R. CRIM. P. 33.
121. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11; Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
122. FEELEY, supra note 113, at 9–11.
123. See Weinstein, supra note 113 (describing dynamic in lower New York
courts); BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., supra note 60.
124. Bowers, supra note 102, at 1707.
125. United States v. Diaz-Ramirez, 646 F.3d 653 (9th Cir. 2011).
126. Id. at 655.
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had the opportunity to opt out of the mass process, their pleas were
sufficiently informed and voluntary.127 In other words, the Court did
not recognize any legally cognizable impact of the fact that procedure
was aggregated: it asked instead whether there was any evidence that
a particular defendant’s plea was involuntary. Other courts have
reached similar conclusions.128
G. The Defendant
The final bastion of individuation is the defendant himself. He has
various constitutional rights to ensure that his case is decided on the
merits in ways that he chooses: he has the right to self-represent, the
right to trial, to testify or to remain silent, and to confront the
witnesses against him.129 Most importantly, given the prevalence of
pleas, he has the right not to be bound by a plea he did not
understand or was coerced into making.130
In the petty offense context, these protections routinely fail to
ensure that defendants receive individual consideration. Many
misdemeanor defendants do not know what their rights are and, given
limited time to consult with counsel, are unlikely to learn or
understand them.131 Instead, defendants typically are made to
understand that they will be represented in a slapdash manner, that
they must plead or risk a longer sentence or a stint in jail, that the
evidence in their cases will not be examined, and that they have no
choice in the matter.
For example, in jurisdictions around the country including Texas,
Washington, Pennsylvania, and Colorado, researchers have found
that judges often refer misdemeanor defendants directly to
prosecutors, without appointing counsel, and tell them to go “work
127. Id. at 657–58. The court also noted that the mass-plea process had previously
been held to violate Rule 11’s “personal address” requirement, id. at 657, but that
error was held to be harmless. Id. (citing United States v. Roblero-Solis, 588 F.3d 692,
701 (9th Cir. 2009)).
128. United States v. Salazar-Olivares, 179 F.3d 228 (5th Cir. 1999) (group plea did
not constitute plain error under Rule 11); United States v. Martinez-Martinez, 69
F.3d 1215, 1223 (1st Cir. 1995) (upholding group plea consisting of two codefendants,
concluding that Rule 11 requirement that each defendant be addressed “personally”
did not mean that each defendant had to be addressed “individually”).
129. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (right to trial and confront witnesses); Faretta v.
California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (right to self-representation); Nix v. Whiteside, 475
U.S. 157 (1986) (right to testify on own behalf).
130. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
131. Natapoff, Misdemeanors, supra note 3, at 1344 (describing limits on average
defendant knowledge and capacity).
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For example, in Georgia, one ABA witness

[A] mass arraignment of defendants charged with jailable
misdemeanors during which the judge informed defendants of their
rights and then left the bench. Afterwards, three prosecutors told
defendants to line up and follow them one by one into a private
room. When the judge reentered the courtroom, each defendant
approached with the prosecutor, who informed the judge that the
defendant intended to waive counsel and plead guilty to the
charges.133

In such cases, the tribunal effectively instructs defendants that their
only option is to plead guilty. Even when counsel is appointed, the
high volume process puts defense counsel in the position of
channeling defendants into pleas rather than meaningfully educating
them about their rights and options.
The sum total of aggregating pressures thus often deprives
defendants of autonomous choice, the defendant’s last defense
against group treatment and collective guilt. I say “often” due to the
sheer number of defendants who are processed in low-level courts
without counsel or meaningful representation.
There are
approximately ten million misdemeanor cases filed every year, the
vast majority of which are processed in bulk without meaningful
scrutiny or assistance of counsel.134 Nevertheless, misdemeanor
defendants are not all similarly situated: better-educated and betterresourced defendants can demand more individuation, in large part
because they can insist on lawyers and procedures that preserve the
individuating aspects of their cases.135 By contrast, sub-literate and
disadvantaged defendants are stuck with group procedures with no
meaningful way to opt out. In these ways, the aggregating pressure of
the misdemeanor process silences most individuals even as it creates
the appearance of individuated admissions of guilt.
The urban misdemeanor process can thus be understood as a series
of iterative aggregations. From arrest to bail to defense to plea,
urban misdemeanants are subject to an array of informal aggregating

132. See BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., supra note 60, at 16–17.
133. AM. BAR ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS,
supra note 113, at 24–25.
134. BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., supra note 60, at 11.
135. See, e.g., PAUL BUTLER, LET’S GET FREE: A HIP-HOP THEORY OF JUSTICE 3–
19 (2009) (describing his experiences when he was prosecuted for misdemeanor
assault).
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forces that generate their ultimate convictions. Like all complex
processes, the picture is not absolute: there may well be some
individuating factors at each stage of the process. But the continuous
pressure of aggregate decision making stage after stage weakens their
force. For example, a defendant may consult briefly with counsel, or
there may be some evidence that he might be guilty. These brushes
with procedure and evidence do not mean he actually got an
individuated determination of guilt, or that his conviction was
generated in a meaningful sense by the evidence. Instead, his
conviction is better understood as the sort of thing likely to happen to
people in his class. That is a far cry from the individuation ideal
celebrated in Supreme Court case law and by the theories of personal
culpability that undergird our moral confidence in the criminal
process.
IV. THE SUBSTANTIVE EFFECTS OF INFORMAL AGGREGATION:
LESSONS FROM THE CIVIL SIDE
Unlike criminal law, civil law openly makes room for aggregation.
The formal mechanisms of the class action, joinder, and multidistrict
litigation have generated a robust literature on the dynamics of
aggregation and its substantive and distributive effects.136 It is well
understood that the decision to formally treat parties or issues in the
aggregate changes the meaning and operation of the law.137
This understanding has carried over into the realm of informal
aggregation. Civil law has its share of informal aggregating scenarios,
and scholars have identified ways that they can have substantive and
distributive effects even without formal class certification or other
legally binding mechanisms. In particular, two insights have strong
resonance for the misdemeanor context. The first is that a single
powerful plaintiff bringing a large number of claims against dispersed
defendants can induce widespread settlement on terms that may not
track the substantive law or likely trial outcomes. The second insight
is that aggregate treatment of similarly situated plaintiffs through
mass representation erodes the force of law and evidence, and can
effectively create a no-fault regime in which mere allegations of injury
can suffice to generate recovery. These insights—and their relevance

136. E.g., Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregation and Its Discontents: Class Settlement
Pressure, Class-Wide Arbitration, and CAFA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1872, 1873 (2006)
(describing the influence that aggregate proceedings have on settlement).
137. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION (2010).
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to understanding the power of prosecutors and the dangers of mass
indigent representation—are discussed below.
A. The Power of Affirmative Informal Aggregation
A certain class of civil defendant strongly resembles misdemeanor
defendants.
The class consists of individuals who engage in
widespread, common conduct generating small, low value claims: a
leading example is unauthorized music downloaders. There are
thousands of them. When sued by a single powerful plaintiff, such
defendants often lack the resources or incentives to litigate on their
own, even if they have a valid defense, and therefore predictably
settle in large numbers.
Assaf Hamdani and Alon Klement zero in on this type of
defendant class as posing special efficacy and fairness problems for
the civil system.138 They examine three examples: music file sharing,
people sued by DirecTV as suspected signal pirates, and purchasers
of fraudulent business leases who defaulted and were then sued by
the seller LeaseComm.139 In each case, a well-resourced corporate
plaintiff (Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA),
DirecTV, and LeaseComm respectively) brought cases against
thousands of individuals in which the low value of each individual
claim made it inefficient for individuals to defend, leading in turn to
thousands of settlements.140 In each case, there was at least a
plausible—and in some cases very clear—basis for defense, but
defendants settled anyway.141
This institutional paradigm—a single well-resourced plaintiff
bringing low-value claims against thousands of dispersed
defendants—has familiar and influential contours. First, it generates
widespread settlement even where claims may be weak or fraudulent.
This is the misdemeanor process through the civil looking glass: in the
criminal version, large numbers of low-level offenders lack counsel
and/or personal resources and therefore plead guilty when confronted
by the unified power of the state, even where evidence is weak or the
defendants are clearly innocent.142

138. Assaf Hamdani & Alon Klement, The Class Defense, 93 CAL. L. REV. 685
(2005).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 699–708.
142. See supra Part III.
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The paradigm also permits plaintiffs to raise the costs of litigation
for defendants in ways that ensure settlements that may be out of line
with the actual merits of the cases.143 Hamdani and Klement find this
dynamic particularly troubling because it distorts the effect of legal
rules and undermines the civil system’s ability to produce legally
accurate and efficient outcomes through bargaining.144 Criminal
scholars have noted the comparable function of charge inflation and
bail: by overcharging defendants and seeking pre-trial detention,
prosecutors inflate defendant litigation costs in ways that induce
settlement, sometimes to charges that bear a weak relation to actual
defendant conduct.145
As a counter-weight, Hamdani and Klement note that defendants
could aggregate in order to exploit the same economies of scale,
resources and leverage that large plaintiffs do.146 Unlike civil law,
however, the criminal arena has an inherent institutional imbalance:
prosecutors can constitutionally and ethically aggregate on merits
issues whereas defense counsel for the most part cannot.
Prosecutorial offices can act in unison, with policies that impose
uniform charges and/or sentence offers on entire classes of
defendants.147 By contrast, defense counsel must litigate each case as
if it were their only one, bargaining in the shadow of aggregate
prosecutorial policies without adopting aggregate practices of their
own. A public defender office, for example, cannot insist that all
trespassing cases go to trial, or that all loitering clients plead to time
served, because such policies might not be in individual defendants’
best interests.148 This is in part why criminal defendants depend on
143. For example, RIAA and DirecTV set settlement amounts unrelated to actual
damages. Hamdani & Klement, supra note 138, at 704. LeaseComm brought all its
actions in Massachusetts, which made it exorbitantly expensive for non-resident
defendants to litigate. Id. at 707.
144. Id. at 706, 708.
145. William Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV.
505, 519–20 (2001) (on charge inflation); Bibas, supra note 115 (on the pressure
exerted by bail).
146. Hamdani and Klement label this mechanism the “class defense.” In the cases
they discuss, potential defenses included fair use, problems with DirecTV’s proof of
piracy, and the legitimacy of the underlying LeaseComm lease. Hamdani & Klement,
supra note 138, at 699–708.
147. See, e.g., Kay L. Levine & Ronald F. Wright, Prosecution in 3-D, 102 J. CRIM
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1119, 1150 (2012) (describing prosecutor’s office manual that set
forth “‘defaults’ for case resolutions (that is, standard plea offers)”).
148. Margareth Etienne, The Ethics of Cause Lawyering: An Empirical
Examination of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Cause Lawyers, 95 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1195, 1235–43 (2005) (describing ethical impediments to collective
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collateral proceedings such as civil rights class actions to vindicate
group rights; the individuated ideal of the criminal case impedes
strategic aggregation on the part of the defense.149 Criminal counsel
thus have weak access to the collective leverage that informal
aggregation can confer.
B.

How Mass Representation Erodes Fault

A certain class of civil plaintiff also strongly resembles
misdemeanor defendants. One example is plaintiffs represented by
one or more large law firms who collectively work out bulk deals,
which Richard Nagareda has called “mass settlement without class
action.”150 Similarly, plaintiffs with small, low stakes personal injury
claims such as car accidents whose cases are handled en masse by socalled “settlement mills,” also resemble misdemeanor defendants.151
As Nora Engstrom describes, these large firms often handle
thousands of small cases at a time and almost universally resolve
them through settlement on a categorical basis, often by non-legal
personnel with little attorney involvement.152 Factual investigation
and trials are almost non-existent, and plaintiffs receive standardized
settlement sums from insurance companies.153 Much like criminal
defendants whose public defenders handle hundreds of cases in
cookie-cutter fashion, low-stakes tort plaintiffs whose claims are
handled by settlement mill firms are processed mechanically without
individuated attention.154 In the same way that petty defendants

public defender action but also describing instances where defender offices
collectively resisted prosecutorial policies); see also Kim Taylor-Thompson,
Individual Actor v. Institutional Player: Alternating Visions of the Public Defender,
84 GEO. L.J. 2419, 2422 (1996) (criticizing tendency of public defender offices to
“uncritically accept individualized concepts of their role”).
149. See Brandon Garrett, Aggregation and Constitutional Rights (Univ. of Va.
Sch. of Law Pub Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series No. 2012-31, 2012),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2052250 (arguing that aggregation of procedural
civil rights claims can benefit plaintiffs and the development of law and describing
barriers to such aggregation).
150. Richard A. Nagareda, Embeded Aggregation in Civil Litigation, 95 CORNELL
L. REV. 1105, 1154–55 (2010) (discussing mass settlement in Vioxx case coordinated
by large plaintiff law firms).
151. Nora Freeman Engstrom, Sunlight and Settlement Mills, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV.
805 (2011) [hereinafter Engstrom, Sunlight]; see also Nora Freeman Engstrom, Runof-the-Mill Justice, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1485 (2009).
152. See Engstrom, Sunlight, supra note 151, at 817.
153. Id. at 816–17.
154. Id.
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predictably plead and receive standard sentences, plaintiffs settle for
standardized sums.155
In the tort context, settlement mills offer certain benefits. Plaintiffs
with low-value claims might not otherwise obtain representation.156
For routine and non-serious claims, plaintiffs may well receive an
approximation of the actual value of their injuries.157 And they
receive the money quickly and predictably without the cost and
uncertainty of individualized litigation.158 In such cases, the benefits
of bulk processing may outweigh the costs and risks of
individuation.159
Such arguments are not completely foreign in the criminal context.
For example, routine bulk processing confers certain professional
benefits on misdemeanor prosecutors and even defense counsel:
attorneys can spend less time resolving standard cases and obtain
predictable outcomes without the cost and time of litigation.160 Courts
similarly benefit by being able to clear crowded dockets, and
resources may be preserved for more serious cases.161 More radically,
Josh Bowers has argued that misdemeanor defendants themselves are
typically better off accepting standardized low-level plea offers
because it permits them to avoid pre-trial jail time and the potential
for higher sentences were they to litigate.162 In Bowers’s view, then,
even innocent criminal defendants benefit instrumentally from the
misdemeanor settlement mill.
At the same time, settlement mills raise troubling red flags. In
particular, Engstrom worries that plaintiffs with non-routine, more
serious injuries are being shortchanged both procedurally and
substantively by having their claims resolved in aggregate fashion.163
She argues that many plaintiffs are unaware that settlement mills do
not actually provide traditional personal representation, or sometimes
even representation by lawyers at all, and that these plaintiffs are

155. Id. at 822.
156. Id. at 831–32.
157. Id. at 828–29.
158. Id. at 829.
159. Id. at 824–33 (discussing costs and benefits of settlement mills).
160. See Bibas, supra note 115 (explaining that institutional and professional
norms governing criminal legal practice often drive case resolutions more powerfully
than do individual facts of the case).
161. See, e.g., Erica Hashimoto, The Price of Misdemeanor Representation, 49
WM. & MARY L. REV. 461 (2007).
162. Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117 (2008).
163. Engstrom, Sunlight, supra note 151, at 836–42.
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essentially being tricked.164 She also notes that the lack of scrutiny
and the culture of settlement promote fraud.165
The settlement mill scenario highlights the fact that the ability to
resist aggregation and insist on individuated procedure is a potent
bargaining chip. That is why Engstrom worries about plaintiffs with
serious injuries: by permitting themselves to be represented in the
aggregate, they forgo the leverage that an individual adjudication
would confer.166 Conversely, businesses that can resist potential
plaintiff aggregation by insisting on individuated procedures such as
arbitration obtain an advantage.167 This is precisely the dynamic of
the penal pyramid: at the bottom, mass processing induces settlement
by individual defendants unless they and/or their counsel can insist on
the “luxury” of more expensive and time-consuming individuated
procedures.
The deepest insight from the settlement mill context, however, is
that this sort of informal aggregation has substantive implications:
settlement mills effectively create a no-fault tort scheme even in the
absence of such a regime at law.168 As Engstrom describes it,
settlement mills “straddl[e] no-fault and traditional tort,” providing a
“blended mechanism” that offers many of the benefits of a no-fault
scheme while “masquerading” as a traditional, individuated tort
process.169 This slight-of-hand is apparent to everyone except
individual plaintiffs. As one attorney put it, “It really was very
formulaic. Everybody saw it that way, except for the client, who
actually thought of themselves as an individual.”170
The same slight-of-hand occurs in the misdemeanor process:
pleading petty offenders in bulk without individuated procedures
effectively creates a “no-fault” conviction regime in which the fact of

164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 838–39.
167. See W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Arbitration and the Individuation Critique, 49
ARIZ. L. REV. 69, 69 (2007) (“Skeptics [of arbitration] object that businesses use
arbitration to prevent [plaintiffs’] aggregation, forcing consumer and employee
claimants into individualized proceedings where neither they nor their lawyers can
counter the advantages enjoyed by more powerful repeat players.”).
168. See also Hamdani & Klement, supra note 138, at 708 (“A regime in which
defendants always settle is essentially a no-fault regime.”).
169. Engstom, Sunlight, supra note 151, at 837.
170. Id.
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arrest is sufficient to induce settlement.171 While professional
participants know that the process is “assembly line,” the system
straddles the “no-fault”-culpability distinction by maintaining the
fiction that defendants are receiving individuated justice based on
personal culpability.
It is here that the possibility of fraud and its criminal counterpart,
wrongful conviction, poses the greatest threat. In a no-fault scheme,
proof of the right sort of injury is typically sufficient to trigger
recovery.172 The integrity of the system thus rests heavily on the
validity of the initial proof, since recovery flows inevitably from it.
But weak screening mechanisms and routine settlement habits
weaken that proof.
With respect to settlement mills, the
understanding that insurance companies will settle in exchange for
limited liability and cost-control creates the risk that fraudulent
claims will slip though.173 In the same way, the understanding
between defense counsel and prosecution that the vast majority of
petty cases will be pled out without litigation permits false claims—
i.e., bad arrests and baseless charges—to convert to convictions.
This is the misdemeanor system at its worst: when the mere
allegation of probable cause, i.e., the fact of arrest, becomes enough
to guarantee conviction. Without the robust checking mechanisms of
the adversarial process, we cannot be confident that those initial
allegations are valid. In these ways, the institutional aggregations of
mass representation simultaneously erode the legal status of fault and
exacerbate the risk of wrongful conviction.174
V. THE OXYMORON OF AGGREGATE CRIMINAL GUILT
Criminal justice is a special sort of law—at least it is supposed to
be. As Henry Hart famously put it, a crime “is not simply anything
which a legislature chooses to call a ‘crime.’”175 Likewise, the power

171. This scheme is “no-fault” in the institutional sense that the government need
not prove culpability, not in the narrower, substantive sense that the defendants lack
mens rea.
172. Robert L. Rabin, The Renaissance of Accident Law Plans Revisited, 64 MD.
L. REV. 699, 703–15 (2005) (describing a variety of no-fault compensation schemes
and their respective triggers).
173. Engstrom, Sunlight, supra note 151, at 833–34.
174. I discuss this shift away from fault at length in the first article, Natapoff,
Misdemeanors, supra note 3, at 1366–68.
175. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 401, 406 (1958) (arguing that in order to qualify as a crime, prohibited
conduct must invite community condemnation).
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to punish is a unique form of governmental authority that can be
exercised only in highly constrained ways consistent with democratic
values.176 While we lack agreement about what precisely should
constitute a crime, or the proper way to punish, the ongoing dispute
reflects an underlying consensus that criminal justice is different in
kind from other legal edicts and forms of governmental control.
The urban misdemeanor system strains the limits of criminal law
exceptionalism. Many petty offenses forbid common, widespread,
victimless conduct of no particular moral import—in other words,
conduct that doesn’t look particularly culpable. Order maintenance
policing is often driven by aims barely distinguishable from urban
public policies such as zoning, traffic laws, and health and housing
codes.177 And as this Article has detailed, urban misdemeanants are
often handled in the aggregate: identified, prosecuted, and punished
in ways that ignore definitional criminal commitments to
individuation, evidence, and the ultimate requirement that
defendants be personally culpable.178
To put it another way, the defining principles of criminal justice
appear to run out of steam at the bottom of the penal pyramid where
offenses are petty and defendants are poorest. At the top, in serious
cases and for well-resourced defendants, the principles are alive and
well largely because such defendants have the leverage to insist on
individuated procedures. At the bottom, however, these principles do
little work. This fact has at least two significant consequences. The
first is to destabilize the traditional assertion that the criminal system

176. See Alice Ristroph, Respect and Resistance in Punishment Theory, 97 CAL. L.
REV. 601, 614 (2009) (describing classic Hobbesian claim that “[o]nly the sovereign—
who is not a party to the social contract—retains the broad discretion to use force,
and so only the sovereign may punish”); Dolovich, supra note 10.
177. See, e.g., NICOLE STELLE GARNETT, ORDERING THE CITY: LAND USE,
POLICING, AND THE RESTORATION OF URBAN AMERICA 2–3 (2009); Katherine
Beckett & Steve Herbert, The Punitive City Revisited: The Transformation of Urban
Social Control, in AFTER THE WAR ON CRIME: RACE, DEMOCRACY AND A NEW
RECONSTRUCTION 106, 109–10 (Mary Louise Frampton et al. eds., 2008) (describing
the variety of urban criminal legal tools deployed to “‘clean up’ particular urban
spaces”).
178. Mona Lynch argues that this group-based conceptualization of the criminal
defendant pervades criminal law more generally. She argues that “[t]he individuality
formerly ascribed to offenders has nearly vanished. In its place is a broad, nearcaricaturelike construction of the punished offender that relies on simple, dispositionbased understandings of criminality and a variety of racial, cultural, class-based, and
gendered stereotypes as its basis.” Mona Lynch, The Contemporary Penal Subject(s),
in AFTER THE WAR ON CRIME: RACE, DEMOCRACY AND A NEW RECONSTRUCTION
89, 98 (Mary Louise Frampton et al. eds., 2008).
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is individuated and rule-bound.179 Because the bottom of the pyramid
is very big—most U.S. cases are petty and most defendants are
poor180—our systemic ideals of individuation, due process, and
culpability actually govern a relatively small percentage of cases.
Instead, and counterintuitively, the aggregative culture of the bottom
is in fact the dominant systemic norm, even though it baldly
contradicts individuating legality principles in Supreme Court
doctrine and much of the theoretical criminal literature.
The second consequence is to create uncertainty about the
appropriate legal and moral significance of convictions generated at
the bottom of the penal pyramid. Misdemeanor aggregative culture
all too often ignores the core premise of the criminal model: that the
question of guilt is ultimately and essentially one of individual
responsibility. It is precisely because (and only when) criminal guilt is
individualized that we are justified in levying individual judgments,
punishment, and stigma against those found to be criminal.181
Without this bedrock ingredient of individuation, a “conviction”
means something very different. Insofar as urban misdemeanor
convictions lack individualization, we need to question the pedigree
of the process at the bottom of the penal pyramid and ask whether it
truly qualifies as “criminal.”
One way to ask that question is through the lens of Herbert
Packer’s famous distinction between the “Crime Control” and “Due
Process” models of criminal justice.182 The misdemeanor system is the
quintessential example of how a system ostensibly governed by
“formal, adjudicative, adversary fact-finding processes”183 and
putatively committed to the “primacy of the individual and the

179. See William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure
and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (1997) (noting that the traditional picture of
the criminal system as governed by formal criminal procedure is “wrong”).
180. Approximately ten million misdemeanor cases are filed each year. By
comparison, there are approximately one million annual felony convictions.
Natapoff, Misdemeanors, supra note 3, at 1320.
181. See e.g., W. David Ball, The Civil Case at the Heart of Criminal Procedure: In
re Winship, Stigma, and the Civil-Criminal Distinction, 38 AM. J. CRIM. L. 117 (2011)
(arguing that stigma constitutes the defining line between civil and criminal
punishment).
182. HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 153 (1968); see
also Hadar Aviram, Packer in Context: Formalism and Fairness in the Due Process
Model, 36 LAW & SOC. INQ. 237 (2011) (surveying “academic fascination” with
Packer’s two models).
183. PACKER, supra note 182, at 163–64.
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complementary concept of limitation of official power”184 can in fact
function as a crime control model driven by a “presumption of
guilt”185 in which “routine stereotyped procedures” produce “an
assembly-line conveyor belt down which moves an endless stream of
cases.”186 Although Packer posited the crime control model as an
ideal type and not an actual description,187 the aggregating tendencies
of the petty offense process in fact amount to a crime control
system—legal practices through which people are presumed guilty
upon arrest and treated not as individuals entitled to due process, but
rather as threats or risks subject to monitoring and control. The
informal aggregations of the urban petty offense system are thus not
mistakes or mere deviations from the due process model: they are the
concrete socio-legal practices and institutions that permit the crime
control model to function and dispense criminal convictions
notwithstanding the existence of a legitimating due process
ideology.188
A different way of framing the question—are misdemeanors really
“criminal”?—is to ask whether the mass quality of the American
criminal system has altered its normative nature and political
authority. In 1994, Malcolm Feeley and Jonathan Simon maintained
that the “Old Penology”—concerned with individual guilt and moral
responsibility—was giving way to an “actuarial” approach to justice
concerned with management of groups.189 In 2006, Bernard Harcourt
worried that “prediction instruments increasingly determine
individual outcomes in our policing, law enforcement, and
punishment practices.”190 In 2012, Stephanos Bibas mourned that the
“[c]riminal justice used to be individualized, moral, transparent and
participatory, but has become impersonal, amoral, hidden, and
insulated from the people.”191
Misdemeanors represent the
paradigmatic example of these sociological claims: the place in the
system where doctrinal commitments to individuality and personal
fault are most eroded, and where actuarial, impersonal tendencies
exert the greatest power over outcomes. In other words, if the
184. Id. at 165.
185. Id. at 160 (in many cases the “presumption of guilt” begins to operate “as
soon as the suspect is arrested”).
186. Id. at 159.
187. Id. at 153.
188. I am indebted to Markus Dubber for this point.
189. See Feeley & Simon, supra note 55, at 173.
190. HARCOURT supra note 55, at 2 .
191. STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE xviii (2012).
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misdemeanor process qualifies as criminal, it is because we’ve
changed what the criminal system does and how it is allowed to do it.
Markus Dubber makes a similar point, arguing that the war on
crime, with its focus on possession, drugs, and other victimless
offenses, is in fact a policing regime that seeks to control and
eliminate threats rather than identify and punish individual crimes.
As he puts it:
Policing human threats is different from punishing persons. A
police regime doesn’t punish. It seeks to eliminate threats . . . . It
resembles environmental regulation of hazardous waste more than it
does the criminal law of punishment.192

Dubber traces how modern policing—by which he means not only
police investigations and arrests but the entire criminal apparatus—
has eroded or “hollowed out” criminal law’s classic ingredients from
mens rea and actus reus to the harm principle. He concludes that the
war on crime is best understood as a form of “state nuisance
control.”193
Importantly, Dubber notes that although the policing regime is
non-criminal in its essence, it masquerades as a criminal process:
The effort to disguise itself as bread-and-butter criminal law is an
important component of a modern police regime. . . . [Because of
potential opposition it i’s] in the interest of a police regime both to
retain traces of traditional criminal law and to infiltrate traditional
criminal law by manipulating its established doctrines, rather than to
do away with it altogether.194

This masquerade is precisely the dynamic of the misdemeanor
system. By calling itself a criminal process and labeling its outcomes
as criminal convictions, the petty offense system has co-opted the
tools of criminal investigation and adjudication while abandoning
core principles of individuated culpability.195
The masquerade
succeeds in part because criminal law lacks analytic tools to identify

192. Markus Dirk Dubber, Policing Possession: The War on Crime and the End of
Criminal Law, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 829, 833 (2001).
193. Id. at 834, 839; see also MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, THE POLICE POWER:
PATRIARCHY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 158–61 (2005)
(arguing that petty offenses have historically evaded legality constraints).
194. Dubber, supra note 192, at 834.
195. See Fabricant, supra note 14, at 388 (arguing that zero tolerance policing
effectively imposes group guilt); Eric J. Miller, Role-Based Policing: Restraining
Police Conduct “Outside the Legitimate Investigative Sphere,” 94 CAL. L. REV. 617,
620 (2006) (arguing that because urban policing is so ill-suited to the criminal model,
public officials other than police should do it).
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the “hollowing out” effects of aggregation. More broadly, it succeeds
because transparency and political accountability are in short supply
at the bottom of the pyramid.
Finally, the misdemeanor process may succeed in retaining its
“criminal” pedigree in the self-fulfilling sense that widespread
informal aggregation has altered our collective understanding of what
justice is supposed to look like. It is well known that racial profiling is
self-reinforcing, exacerbating social stereotypes and sending a
message of “presumed Black criminality.”196 Aggregation works in
similar ways within the adjudicative system to create a presumption of
guilt. Heavy caseloads and bulk processing wear down prosecutors,
defense attorneys, and judges, causing them to lose touch with the
individuating principles that are supposed to govern their respective
roles.197 As Judge Robert Pratt put it,
[w]ith so many guilty pleas taking place, it is far too easy for
everyone involved to start believing that ‘everyone is guilty’ and that
establishing guilt on the record is just a ‘formality.’ With such an
attitude comes complacency and a lack of attention to the details of
the plea proceeding.198

Like racial profiling, the dehumanizing component of aggregation
changes the ways that its subjects are perceived.
Even defendants may succumb and lose sight of their own
individuality as the system treats them in the aggregate over and over
again. As professor and veteran public defender Abbe Smith once
put it, “[o]ne of the most outrageous things about indigent criminal
defense is the lack of outrage in many clients.Too often the poor
become accustomed to mistreatment. They become accustomed to
being processed like parts on a conveyor belt, to not being seen at
all.”199

196. Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword: Race, Vagueness, and the Social Meaning of
Order-Maintenance Policing, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 775, 800–01 (1999); see
also Devon W. Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946,
952 (2002) (describing psychological effects on African Americans of their
subordinate position and vulnerability to constant police scrutiny).
197. See AMY BACH, ORDINARY INJUSTICE: HOW AMERICA HOLDS COURT 257–66
(2009); Bibas, supra note 115, at 2474, 2482 (on the institutional habits of defense and
prosecutors).
198. Judge Robert Pratt, The Implications of Padilla v. Kentucky on Practice in
United States District Courts, 31 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 169, 180 (2011).
199. Abbe Smith, Too Much Heart and Not Enough Heat: The Short Life and
Fractured Ego of the Empathetic, Heroic Public Defender, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1203, 1261 (2004).
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All this is to say that the way we actually run the criminal system
affects our conception of how we should run the criminal system.
Harcourt argues that the turn towards the actuarial has “begun to
shape our conception of just punishment,” such that we now accept
prediction as a just and fair way of evaluating culpability and
punishment.200 Likewise, the turn towards aggregation is making
group-based treatment and mass processes seem familiar and
acceptable, weakening our intuitive and longstanding commitment to
individuated guilt, and permitting the petty offense process to “pass”
for criminal justice.
CONCLUSION
“When you’re young and you’re black, no matter how you look you
fit the description.”

–Tyquan, age 18, Brooklyn resident201

At the heart of the criminal system’s claim to coercive and punitive
legitimacy lies the assertion that it convicts and punishes for the right
reasons: because someone committed a crime and was therefore
culpable in ways that invite a coercive state response. And for all the
flaws in the ways that serious crimes are investigated and prosecuted,
these reasons remain dominant. With rare exceptions, rape and
homicide defendants are arrested and prosecuted because someone
thinks they committed a crime. Of course, as the innocence
movement has demonstrated, those conclusions are all too often
factually inaccurate, but the process remains constrained by classic
criminal law justifications of evidence and culpability.
By contrast, the urban misdemeanor system is not always driven by
such justifications. At its best, order maintenance policing aims to do
what zoning, nuisance law, and other urban development policies do:
improve the livability, safety, and economic value of shared urban

200. HARCOURT, supra note 55, at 31; see also Feeley & Simon, supra note 55, at
192 (“It is not that [law enforcement] officials are ‘merely’ violating traditional ideals
of equality when dealing with or intervening in underclass communities, it is that they
are animated by a powerful new social logic, risk management.”).
201. Julie Dressner & Edwin Martinez, The Scars of Stop-and-Frisk, N.Y. TIMES
(June 13, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/video/2012/06/12/opinion/100000001601732/
the-scars-of-stop-and-frisk.html (1:03).
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spaces.202 Those are laudable goals, but they are not centrally about
evidence and culpability. The bureaucracies of the adjudicative
process—prosecution offices, public defenders, and courts—largely
obey institutional demands for case processing and docket clearing.
These processes may be more efficient than the individuated model,
but they are dissociated from the core culpability concerns of criminal
law. In these concrete ways, the urban petty offense process has let
go of the reasons and procedures that validate the imposition of
criminal convictions.
In part as a result, the urban misdemeanor process is losing its
credibility with the people it polices and convicts.203 Residents of
places like Brownsville clearly believe that they are selected by race,
class status, and neighborhood, in other words based on group
membership and other aggregate criteria and not on the
individualized bases of evidence and culpability.204 As Tyquan, the
18-year-old African American man quoted above put it, “I was so
confused the first time [I was stopped by police.] I thought you had
to do something for them to really stop you, but after that, I seen that
you didn’t have to do nothing to get stopped.”205 While the petty
criminal process maintains that it is motivated by crime and disorder,
its subjects apparently believe it to be motivated by social status.
The foregoing analysis suggests that the subjects have it right, at
least more right than criminal law gives them credit for. The weak
individuating procedures in the petty offense process have eroded the
roles that evidence and law play in generating convictions, and
aggregate decision-making dominates each stage of the process. A
young black male in a poor urban neighborhood out in public at night
has a predictable chance of being arrested for and ultimately
convicted of a minor urban offense of some kind, whether he commits
any criminal acts or not. The fact that some weakly individuating

202. See, e.g., GARNETT, supra note 177, at 208–09 (2009); TRACEY MEARES &
DAN KAHAN, URGENT TIMES: POLICING AND RIGHTS IN INNER CITY COMMUNITIES
(1999).
203. See Jeffrey Fagan & Tracey L. Meares, Punishment, Deterrence and Social
Control: The Paradox of Punishment in Minority Communities, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM.
L. 173, 212–22 (2008) (charting law enforcement’s reduced legitimacy in overpoliced
minority communities).
204. Dressner & Martinez, supra note 201; Matthew Orr, Ray Rivera & Al Baker,
Stop
and
Frisk
in
Brownsville,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
11,
2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/video/2010/07/11/nyregion/1247468422062/stop-and-frisk-inbrownsville-brooklyn.html (interviewing African American residents).
205. Dressner & Martinez, supra note 201.
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factors may appear in that process—perhaps he will make a furtive
gesture, or consult with counsel for a few minutes—does not render
the process individuated. Rather, that process is best understood as
imposing guilt in the aggregate. If the urban misdemeanor process is
to regain its credibility with its own subjects, it needs either to
embrace the individuated model more fully, or relinquish the punitive
moral mantle of criminal law and admit that it is attempting to do
something different.

